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ARTICLES
What Is Left of the Radical Right?
The Economic Agenda of the Dutch Freedom Party 2006-2017
Simon Otjes*
Abstract
This article examines the economic agenda of the Dutch Freedom Party. It finds
that this party mixes left-wing and right-wing policy positions. This inconsistency
can be understood through the group-based account of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016),
which proposes that the welfare state agenda of radical right-wing populist parties
can be understood in terms of populism, nativism and authoritarianism. Each of
these elements is linked to a particular economic policy: economic nativism, which
sees the economic interest of natives and foreigners as opposed; economic populism,
which seeks to limit economic privileges for the elite; and economic authoritarian‐
ism, which sees the interests of deserving and undeserving poor as opposed. By
using these different oppositions, radical right-wing populist parties can reconcile
left-wing and right-wing positions.
Keywords: radical right-wing populist parties, economic policies, welfare chauvin‐
ism, populism, deserving poor.
1 Introduction
Political scientists find it difficult to pinpoint the economic policy position of rad‐
ical right-wing populist parties. For instance, in the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Sur‐
vey (CHES), the uncertainty around the average economic left-right estimate of
radical right-wing populist parties (expressed as the standard error) was 80%
greater than the uncertainty for liberal or social-democratic parties (Bakker et al.,
2014; author’s calculations). Voters also find it difficult to place these parties. For
instance, when asked to place the Dutch Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid,
PVV) on a redistribution dimension, 14% of voters in the 2012 Dutch electoral
survey could not place it; 38% put them on the pro-redistribution side and 28%
on the anti-redistribution side (Van der Kolk, Tillie, Van Erkel, & van der Velden,
2012; author’s calculations).1
* Assistant professor of political science at Leiden University and researcher at the Documentation
Centre Dutch Political Parties of Groningen University.
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The lack of clarity that exists among experts and voters is reflected in debates
among researchers who study radical right-wing populist parties. There are
authors like Rovny (2013) who argue that, in general, radical right-wing populist
parties mix left and right-wing policies to broaden their appeal. Other scholars
such as Kitschelt and McGann (1995) position the family of radical right-wing
populist parties on the economic right, whereas scholars such as De Lange (2007)
place radical right-wing populist parties closer to the economic left.
This article is motivated by two questions. First, what position radical right-
wing populist parties do take on the left-right dimension: is their policy position
clearly left or right-wing, or are their positions mixed? Second, if their positions
are mixed, the question is how radical right-wing populist parties can have views
that seem inconsistent from the perspective of left-right politics but still are
internally coherent. So the goal of the article is not to explain (‘erklären’) why
radical right-wing populist parties have a particular position on the left-right
dimension but to understand (‘verstehen’) how they can have a set of positions
that appear to be contradictory from the perspective of left-right politics. The
group-based account of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) will be an important theoreti‐
cal device to this end. He argues that the core elements of their ideology, their
populism, nativism and authoritarianism, informs their economic profiles. Each
of these elements is linked to a specific economic agenda: economic authoritari‐
anism is a combination of limiting welfare state access to undeserving citizens,
whose poverty is seen as a result of their moral failing, and expanding welfare
state access for deserving citizens, whose poverty is thought to be beyond their
control; economic nativism is reflected in welfare chauvinism and economic pro‐
tectionism; and economic populism is understood here as the opposition to the
economic privileges of elite groups, who disregard the interests of the people they
are supposed to serve.
As will be shown here, this account allows radical right-wing populists to mix
left and right-wing positions as they combine policies that benefit or penalize dif‐
ferent groups. Because radical right-wing populist parties are economically popu‐
list, they are against the privileges of both bankers (a left-wing proposal) and
bureaucrats (a right-wing proposal). Because they are economically nativist and
authoritarian, they want to roll back the welfare state for immigrants and unde‐
serving poor (right-wing) and extend it for natives and deserving poor (left-wing).
In addition to the theoretical integration of thinking in terms of left and
right and in terms of nativism, authoritarianism and populism, this article
extends the group-based account in three ways: by looking at more issues,
another party and the parliamentary arena. The group-based account of Ennser-
Jedenastik (2016) was developed to understand the welfare state policy of radical
right-wing populist parties. This article applies it to economic policy in a broad
perspective, namely as all ways in which the government can intervene or abstain
from intervening in the economy. This selection does not just include welfare state
issues, but also proposals that concern other spheres such as taxation, business
regulation and housing for as far as they have implications for, for example, eco‐
nomic growth, economic equality and the budget. Moreover, this article looks at a
different case, the Dutch Freedom Party, where Ennser-Jedenastik’s article ana‐
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lysed the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ). Finally,
this article analyses parliamentary behaviour, specifically parliamentary resolu‐
tions introduced by PVV MPs. This offers a greater wealth of data and shows that
economic authoritarianism, populism and nativism are more than campaign
tools.
Since the famous statement of Mudde (2007, p. 119), namely that ‘it is not
the economy, stupid’, much has changed. Understanding the economic profiles of
radical right-wing populist parties is of great value, as Mudde (2016, p. 11)
acknowledged almost a decade later: the study of radical right-wing populism
‘must move beyond the dominant focus on the two issues of immigration and
European integration, and reflect the broader range of […] socio-economic issues’.
There are a number of reasons for this: First, many radical right-wing populist
parties have undergone a process of mainstreaming; this process includes attach‐
ing greater importance to economic issues (Akkerman, De Lange, & Rooduijn,
2016; Lefkofridi & Michel, 2017) Second, radical right-wing populist parties have
come closer to government power, either as government parties or support par‐
ties of minority cabinets. This means that these parties actually have the chance
to influence government policy, a large share of which concerns economic man‐
agement. For instance, recent evidence suggests that radical right-wing populist
parties have been able to get welfare chauvinist policies implemented, as Jørgen‐
sen and Thomsen (2016) illustrate in their study of the limits of social welfare
programmes for immigrants and refugees in Denmark. At the same time, govern‐
ment participation can create new dilemmas for these parties such as when their
natural allies are on the political right but their voters have left-wing economic
preferences (Afonso, 2015).
This article first charts the literature on the economic position of radical
right-wing populist parties. Next, it introduces the case of the PVV, considers
what the selection of this case means in terms of external validity and discusses
the study’s methodology. Next, it shows how radical right-wing populist parties
can balance left-wing and right-wing positions. The conclusion in turn focuses on
the meaning of these results for the general discussion of the economics of radical
right-wing populism.
2 Radical Right-Wing Populism Between Economic Right and Left
Until the end of the twentieth century, many political scientists agreed that par‐
ties of the populist radical right also pursued a right-wing, free market economic
agenda. (Betz, 1994; Ignazi, 1992; Kriesi et al., 2008). Kitschelt and McGann
(1995) even went so far as to term the combination of authoritarian, repressive,
nationalist positions on cultural matters and pro-market positions on economic
matters a ‘winning formula’ for the radical right. In their view, the combination of
economic and cultural policies explained much of the electoral success that these
parties had in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Against this consensus, Mudde (2007, p. 119) took a clear position: ‘it’s not
the economy stupid’. He showed that actually many radical right-wing populist
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parties did not favour neo-liberal economic ideas. Moreover, he argued that their
economic policy positions did not motivate voters to vote for radical right-wing
populist parties. Mudde (2007, p. 122) suggested that the economic agendas of
radical right-wing populist parties did share nativism, a core feature of the ideol‐
ogy of the populist radical right: many of these parties had protectionist positions
on trade and welfare chauvinist positions regarding the access of immigrants to
social services. On the subject of more or less state intervention these parties
took centrist or mixed positions (Mudde, 2007, pp. 136-137).
Subsequent studies have looked into this perceived centrism. De Lange
(2007) suggested that the combination of such centrist economic views in combi‐
nation with the parties’ continued commitment to law-and-order and anti-immi‐
gration policies forms a ‘new winning formula’, as this combination allows radical
right populist parties to appeal to working class voters. Lefkofridi and Michel
(2017), Kriesi et al. (2012), Eger and Valdez (2015), Ivaldi (2015) and Harteveld
(2016) observe a further shift to the left on economic issues in many cases that
they study. Their research suggests that many radical right-wing populist parties
now combine left-wing positions on economic issues with right-wing positions on
cultural issues. This combination of left-wing and authoritarian positions is
where according to Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009) most European voters
are concentrated but no parties place themselves: a new winning formula. This
implies that economic policies are only tactical tools for radical right-wing popu‐
list parties ‘to be abandoned as soon as the political wind changed’ (Minkenberg,
2000, pp. 173-174).
Other academics, however, argue that the inconsistent positions that radical
right-wing populist parties had on economic issues meant that these parties are
neither left nor right: Derks (2006), for instance, argues that radical right-wing
populist voters and parties desire a more equal distribution of income but at the
same time do not believe that the welfare state can realize this in an efficient way;
that is these voters favour the principle of egalitarianism but not the principle of
economic interventionism, both of which are considered to be the same from the
traditional left-right perspective. Rovny (2013, pp. 5-6) also observes inconsis‐
tency in the left-right position of radical right-wing populist parties. He attributes
this to a conscious strategy by these parties to capture as many voters as possible
by taking vague and ambiguous policy positions.
These ideas are tested here for the Freedom Party on the basis of the follow‐
ing three mutually exclusive expectations:
Left-wing expectation: A radical right-wing populist party consistently takes
left-wing policy positions on social-economic matters.
Right-wing expectation: A radical right-wing populist party consistently
takes right-wing policy positions on social-economic matters.
Mixed expectation: A radical right-wing populist party takes both left-wing
and right-wing policy positions on social–economic matters.
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3 The Group-Based Approach of the Economic Agenda of Radical Right-
Wing Populists
In contrast to the existing literature, which focuses on the left–right position of
radical right-wing populist parties, Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) has offered the
group-based account to understand their economic policies. These reflect their
radical right-wing populist ideology and specifically its key elements: populism,
nativism and authoritarianism. Each of these three elements has economic impli‐
cations.
Nativism is an ideology that holds that the state should be inhabited exclu‐
sively by members of the native group (Mudde, 2007, p. 19). It sees non-native,
‘alien’ elements as threatening to the homogeneity of the nation state. It creates a
dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Mudde (2007) suggests that nativism can
feed into the economic policies of radical right-wing populist parties. This can
affect their views on immigration and trade. When analysing the welfare state
agenda of the FPÖ, Ennser-Jedenastik (2016, p. 412) saw the implication of its
anti-immigration position: ‘Full benefits should be extended only to members of
the native group, while non-natives should receive limited support if any.’ This
position is generally known as welfare state chauvinism (Andersen & Bjørklund,
1990, p. 212). The core idea is that in order to maintain solidarity within the wel‐
fare state, the welfare state should be restricted only to native people, and for‐
eigners should be excluded (De Koster, Achterberg, & van der Waal, 2012; Keski‐
nen, 2016). Many authors observe this kind of policy in the economic agendas of
radical right-wing populists (De Koster et al., 2012; Keskinen, 2016; Lefkofridi &
Michel, 2017; Mudde, 2007; Norocel, 2016; Schumacher & Van Kersbergen,
2016). Yet if we go beyond welfare state issues and look at a broader array of eco‐
nomic issues, we can see a second way in which nativism may inform a party’s
economic policies: opposition to trade, which may threaten blue-collar jobs (Van
der Waal & de Koster, 2017). Radical right-wing populist parties may favour pro‐
tectionist policies such as tariffs against international trade in order to protect
native jobs. Economic nativism takes a zero-sum approach to international eco‐
nomics: if a country trades with another country, only one can benefit. From the
same perspective, economic nativism opposes development aid and bailouts of
Eurozone countries: if a country sends aid to another country, this represents a
loss of resources for the country that gives aid.
The idea of economic nativism can help to understand the conditions under
which radical right-wing populist parties advocate right-wing economic policies:
Non-native expectation: A radical right-wing populist party takes right-wing
policy positions on social-economic matters if the policy affects non-native
groups.
Populism is a thin ideology. It consists of three claims (Mudde, 2007): first the
people are virtuous and homogeneous. Second, there is the elite, which is corrupt
and acts as a bloc. The elite have deprived the people of their ability to rule. Third,
the populists seek to remedy this: according to populism, the will of the people
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should become policy. Populism is a thin ideology because the terms of people
and elite are empty vessels that can be imbued with meaning derived from differ‐
ent ideologies (Stanley, 2008), such as neo-liberalism or socialism (March, 2011;
Pauwels, 2010). This would mean that there is no such thing as populist econom‐
ics. Ennser-Jedenastik (2016, p. 414), however, argues that populists will tend to
strip politicians and bureaucrats of any economic privilege and that taxpayer
money should be used to the advantage of the ‘common man’. Economic policies
that seek to restrain the economic role of elite groups, by reducing the size of the
bureaucracy, the power of management in the public sector and the spending for
the salaries of politicians are economic populist in this sense. These policies are
often motivated by the idea that in the public sector these elite groups pursue
their own self-interest too much and neglect the interest of the groups their insti‐
tutions are supposed to serve: citizens, students and patients, teachers and doc‐
tors. Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) looks only at public sector elites, but his logic can
be transferred to private sector elites as well, such as bankers: here, populists
argue that the elite’s focus on their own self-interest has endangered the savings
of normal people and that therefore their freedom and income should be capped
in. Economic populism is different from both the economic left and the economic
right. Where the economic left would tend to turn against the privileges of private
sector elites (e.g. bankers), the economic right would turn against the privileges
of public sector elites (e.g. civil servants). Populism takes aim at both owing to its
anti-elitism.
Economic populism can help to understand the conditions under which radi‐
cal right-wing populist parties pursue left-wing or right-wing economic policies:
Public elites expectation: A radical right-wing populist party takes right-wing
policy positions on social-economic matters if the policy affects public-sector
elite groups.
Private elite expectation: A radical right-wing populist party takes left-
wing policy positions on social-economic matters if the policy affects private-
sector elite groups.
Authoritarianism is the idea that ‘infringements on authority are to be punished
severely’ (Mudde, 2007, p. 413). It makes a distinction between, on the one hand,
criminal, immoral groups that ought to be punished and, on the other hand, inno‐
cent, moral groups that ought to be protected. This article follows the work of
Ennser-Jedenastik (2016, p. 413) and Afonso and Papadopolous (2015, p. 620),
who explicitly link authoritarianism to the distinction between deserving and
undeserving poor. There are the undeserving poor, whose poverty can be attrib‐
uted to their own moral failing and who exploit and cheat the welfare state.
Opposed to them are the deserving poor, disabled people whose poverty is due to
circumstances beyond their control and pensioners who have built up their coun‐
tries after the Second World War. To ensure the solidarity in the welfare state,
the undeserving groups must be excluded from its benefits. We can see the logic
of authoritarianism return here: there are immoral, criminal groups who ought to
be punished, those who can work but still rely on the welfare state. Their parasit‐
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ism undermines the social order necessary to maintain the welfare state. From
the perspective of authoritarianism, the deserving poor are a moral, innocent
group, which ought to be protected. The notion of ‘deservingness’ plays an impor‐
tant role in the sociological literature on welfare state support (Handler, 2004;
Van Oorschot, 2006; Will, 1993). Indeed, citizens tend to view seniors and disa‐
bled people as deserving of government support (Bang Petersen, Sloothuus, Stub‐
ager, & Togeby, 2010; Van Oorschot, 2006). People who commit social fraud have
lost their entitlement to support and tend to be seen as the least deserving by
citizens. Economic authoritarianism applies to any proposal that seeks to limit
access to public services for some group, characterized as undeserving, or seeks to
expand public services for some other groups, identified as being deserving. An
example would be a proposal to expel remorseless bullies in order to protect inno‐
cent school children.2
This distinction between deserving and undeserving groups that is at the core
of economic authoritarianism may be useful to differentiate left-wing and right-
wing economic policies of radical right-wing populist parties:
Deserving groups expectation: A radical right-wing populist party takes right-
wing policy positions on social-economic matters if the policy affects unde‐
serving groups.
Undeserving groups expectation: A radical right-wing populist party takes
left-wing policy positions on social-economic matters if the policy affects
deserving groups.
4 Case Selection
It is the goal of the article to understand how radical right-wing populist parties
can balance left and right-wing policies because of their economic nativism, popu‐
lism and authoritarianism. To this end we select the PVV. The PVV is a most
likely case to observe both a mix of left and right-wing positions. As can be seen
in Table 1, in its short existence it made the strongest shift from right to left of
all radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: between 2006 and
2014, according to the CHES, it shifted from 8.3 to 4.6 on a zero to ten social-
economic left-right scale. This is the largest shift a radical right-wing populist
party has made in the database. The PVV shifted from among the rightmost quar‐
tile among the radical right-wing populists to the leftmost quartile. So it is likely
that this party has pursued both left-wing and right-wing policies. As shown in
Table 2, the economic policy positions of other political parties in the Nether‐
lands remained relatively stable during this period. As a most likely case to
observe this phenomenon, the extent to which one can generalize from this case
is limited. The issue of generalization will be discussed in the conclusion.
The PVV is often characterized as a radical right-wing populist party for its
combination of nativism, populism and authoritarianism (Akkerman et al., 2016;
De Lange & Art, 2011; Mudde, 2013; Otjes & Louwerse, 2015; Pellikaan, de Lange
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& van der Meer, 2016; Vossen, 2013). The extensive analysis of Vossen (2013,
pp. 65-110) characterizes its ideology as based on these pillars. One can illustrate
with quotes from their election manifesto: statements like ‘Islam does not belong
to the Netherlands’ or ‘Mass immigration is very harmful for the Netherlands’
exemplify the party’s nativism (PVV, 2012, p. 35); the call for tough penalties for
those who break the law show the party’s authoritarianism (PVV, 2012,
pp. 30-31); and statements like ‘The progressive elite are terrified of the voice of
the people. We are not. So let’s open the voting booth and let the Dutch people
speak’ (PVV, 2012, p. 27) illustrate the party’s populism.
The PVV emerged from the Dutch Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Demo‐
cratie, VVD). The Liberal Party, as Table 2 shows, has a right-wing economic
agenda. It focuses on market solutions, lowering taxation and shrinking govern‐
ment. The party was formed in 2004, when Geert Wilders quit the parliamentary
party of the Liberal Party after a conflict over the ten-point plan that he had writ‐
ten: he advocated that the party move to the right on cultural and economic mat‐
ters (Wilders & Oplaat, 2004). Between 2004 and 2006 Wilders operated as an
independent MP. During this period the Liberal Party governed in a centre-right
coalition with the Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen-Democratisch Appèl,
Table 1 CHES Social-Economic Left-Right Estimates for Radical Right-wing
Populist Parties
Country English Name National Lan-
guage
1999 2002 2006 2010 2014 Chan
ge
Finland Finns Party Perussuomalaiset 5.40 - 4.82 4.30 4.11 -1.29
Denmark Danish People’s
Party
Dansk Folkeparti 7.29 6.08 4.75 5.45 4.50 -2.78
Netherlands Freedom Party Partij voor de Vrijheid - - 8.29 5.23 4.55 -3.73
Sweden Sweden Demo-
crats





6.40 7.31 4.83 5.00 5.50 -0.9
Belgium Flemish Interest Vlaams Belang 8.76 7.90 7.13 7.93 5.50 -3.26
France National Front Front National 8.71 6.00 6.63 6.50 5.91 -2.81
Italy Northern League Lega Nord 8.83 7.28 8.14 7.33 7.29 -1.55










- - - - 8.33 -
United
Kingdom
United Kingdom Independence Party 7.81 - 8.38 8.17 8.57 +0.76
Average 7.60 6.91 6.62 6.16 6.22 -1.38
Source: Bakker et al. (2014).
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CDA) and social-liberal Democrats 66 (Democraten 66, D66). Both parties
embraced a moderate version of the Liberal Party agenda and cooperated with
market-based reforms of healthcare and cutbacks on pensions. In 2006 the PVV
entered in the parliamentary election and won nine seats out of 150. After this
election, a centre-left coalition was formed by the Christian-Democrats, the
social-democratic Labour Party and the Christian-Social Union in Germany (Chris‐
tenUnie, CU). This cabinet was committed to the renewal of the welfare state.
After the financial crisis of 2008, however, it was forced to balance its short-term
investments with long-term austerity measures in order to meet European budg‐
etary requirements. After the 2010 elections, the PVV became a support party for
a centre-right coalition of CDA and VVD. The cabinet followed the austerity
agenda of the previous cabinet. The support agreement committed the PVV to the
budgetary policies of the cabinet but specifically excluded the pension age and
European economic cooperation. The PVV’s cooperation with the centre-right
cabinet lasted until 2012, when the PVV backed out of negotiations over budget
cuts. After the 2012 elections, a centrist Liberal-Labour coalition came to power,
which the PVV strongly opposed.
5 Methodology
Most of the studies of the economic policy positions of radical right-wing populist
parties have focused on their election manifestos or on expert placement (Akker‐
man et al., 2016; De Lange, 2007; Eger & Valdez, 2015; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016;
Lefkofridi & Michel, 2017; Rovny, 2013; Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016).
Table 2 CHES Social-Economic Left-Right Estimates for Dutch Political
Parties
English Name National Language 2006 2010 2014 Change
Socialist Party Socialistische Partij 1.11 1.50 1.00 -0.11
Party for the Animals Partij voor de Dieren - 3.55 2.43 -1.2
GreenLeft GroenLinks 2.00 3.00 2.67 +0.67
Labour Party Partij van de Arbeid 3.56 3.57 3.22 -0.34
50Plus - - 3.67 -
ChristianUnion ChristenUnie 4.13 5.00 4.11 -0.02
Freedom Party Partij voor de Vrijheid 8.29 5.23 4.55 -3.73
Democrats 66 Democraten 66 5.22 5.50 6.56 +1.33
Christian-Democratic
Appeal
Christen-Democratisch Appèl 5.56 6.50 6.56 +1.01
Political Reformed Party Staatkundig Gereformeerde
Partij
- 6.50 6.89 +0.39
Liberal Party Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en
Democratie
7.89 8.29 8.33 +0.44
Average 4.72 4.86 4.54 -0.18
Source: Bakker et al. (2014).
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Election manifestos have a few important drawbacks for those who want to study
economic policy agendas, however: in manifestos, parties can afford to be vague.
Moreover, as radical right-wing populist parties tend to keep these documents
short and focus on issues like safety and immigration, the economic policy para‐
graphs can be relatively short. Two of the four PVV manifestos were shorter than
ten pages. Expert surveys, in contrast, have the problem that one can study only
what the scholarly community already expects to be present at the time of the
survey. It is difficult to test the extent to which new concepts such as ‘economic
populism’ or ‘economic nativism’ matter in previous periods if questions about
this were not included in pre-existing surveys. Therefore, this study focuses on
parties’ activity in parliament.3 In parliament, parties produce a host of proposals
that allow for a more extensive empirical basis. Specifically, this analysis will look
at the substantial proposals PVV members make in the form of motions. After
any committee or plenary debate an MP can propose a motion.4 A motion is an
oft-used parliamentary tool that allows a party to get a parliamentary majority to
back a judgment or a wish (Bovend’Eert & Kummeling, 2010, p. 342; Visscher,
1994, p. 98). Both opposition and coalition parties use this tool, although opposi‐
tion MPs use it more often (Louwerse & Otjes, 2016). Except for motions of no-
confidence, cabinets need not implement motions. Still they play an important
role in the policymaking process: ministers often refer to adopted motions when
they propose legislation (Visscher, 1994, pp. 118-120). This article examines
motions proposed by the PVV in the lower house of the Dutch Parliament con‐
cerning economic policies. The individual unit of measurement is the motion.
Motions can be aggregated for different periods or categories. This study exam‐
ines all motions proposed between 2006 and 2017, which can be accessed
through Louwerse, Otjes, and Van Vonno (2017). The motions where a PVV MP
was the first sponsor were selected.5 Multiple MPs can sponsor motions, but the
first sponsor tends to be the author of the text. There are practically no restric‐
tions to introducing a motion by a single MP except that it must pertain to an
issue that is discussed in parliament. A large number of motions on economic
issues are introduced in the yearly budget debates when any issue concerning the
policy of a government department can be debated. Here, those motions were
selected that were classified under the labels ‘work’, ‘finance’, ‘the economy’, ‘edu‐
cation’, ‘health’, ‘housing’ and ‘social security’ by the clerk of the lower house. This
includes all motions that were proposed during yearly budgetary discussions.
Motions that concern agriculture, defence, justice and transport were excluded.6
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Figure 1 Share of Economic Motions
Share of all PVV motions that concern economic issues over time. The bars are years,
unless there have been elections, in which case the years are split in before and after the
election periods.
Out of a total of 2646 PVV motions, 973 were economic in nature (37% of all its
motions). This is a considerable share of the party’s activities. The introduction of
this article defined economic issues as all ways in which the government can
intervene or abstain from intervening in the economy. A motion was deemed eco‐
nomic if it obliged the government to spend or tax either more or less, if it
obliged the government to decrease or increase regulation in economic sectors or
if it changed access to social services, education, healthcare or social housing. All
coding was done by the author. Figure 1 shows that as a share of total activity of
the party, economic issues stay roughly equal, around a third of all proposals.
The key question is whether radical right-wing populist parties consistently
take policy positions that go in a left- or right-wing direction or whether their
position is mixed. The economic left and right motions are defined in the follow‐
ing way: economic left-wing motions seek to:
1 increase the government’s role in the economy by nationalizing sectors;
2 increase the government’s role in the economy by increasing taxation;
3 increase the government’s role in the economy by increasing regulation;
4 increase the government’s role in the economy by increasing government
spending;
5 increase economic equality through redistribution of income;
6 or increase economic equality by favouring the interests of weaker parties
(such as employees, patients, consumers, pensioners, tenants) over stronger
ones (such as businesses or home-owners).
Economic right-wing motions seek to
1 decrease the government’s role in the economy by privatizing sectors;
2 decrease the government’s role in the economy by reducing taxation;
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3 decrease the government’s role in the economy by reducing regulation;
4 decrease the government’s role in the economy by reducing government
spending;
5 decrease economic equality by limiting access to social services;
6 or decrease economic equality by favouring the interests of stronger parties
(such as businesses or home-owners) over weaker ones.
A separate category was made for motions that were neither left- nor right-wing.
This includes motions that
1 raise as much revenue as they cost (for instance, proposing a spending
increase in healthcare and an equivalent cut to subsidies for the arts);
2 are aimed at providing or cutting public services to small specific groups,
without specifying that this would lead to more or less spending overall;
3 concern international economic issues (e.g. Eurozone membership);
4 pursue valence goals such as growth, stability or fighting fraud;
5 or concern the organization of specific (semi-)public agencies.
After all economic motions are coded as either left, right or neutral, they are
coded as economic populist, authoritarian or nativist. These are approached as
frames. This is not because these three are seen here as merely a rhetorical style
(as Jagers and Walgrave (2007) have argued about populism), but because this
ideology expresses itself as frames in written documents. They are the observable
expressions of these ideologies in these texts. These frames are present when an
opposition is drawn between two groups. As discussed previously, each of the
frames draws upon some opposition: between the people and the elite in popu‐
lism; between national groups and foreigners in nativism; between the deserving
and the undeserving poor in authoritarianism. A frame is present when motions
explicitly mention at least one of the two groups or use language that implicitly
refers to these groups. If one would rely only on explicit mentions of these
groups, motions in which the groups are reified or mentioned indirectly would be
excluded, such as motions that refer to managers as ‘overhead’. This categoriza‐
tion is not exclusive: a motion can be right-wing, economically nativist and eco‐
nomically populist at the same time. Table 3 provides examples of groups.
To test the expectations whether the PVV’s economic policy positions are
consistently left-wing, right-wing or mixed, the balance between left-wing and
right-wing statements is used. This is the share of left-wing motions in a year
subtracted from the share of right-wing motions. If all motions are right-wing the
value is one; if all motions are left-wing the value is minus one. The value is zero
if there is a perfect balance between left-wing and right-wing motions or if all
motions are neutral. The left-wing expectation is corroborated if this score is
clearly and consistently positive; the right-wing expectation is corroborated if this
score is clearly and consistently negative; the mixed expectation if this score is
close to zero. The idea is that economic nativism, authoritarianism and populism
can be used to understand the choice for left or right-wing policies. To test the
expectations concerning the conditions under which the PVV pursues left- or
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right-wing policies, an ordered logistic regression is employed with the left-right
position of the policy as the dependent variable and the group referents as the
independent variable. For the groups related to populism referents, the variables
are interacted with the sector, which the policy referred to, in order to differenti‐
ate, for instance public and private sector elites and mass.7 The utility of these
categories also depends on their use by parties: if, for instance, a majority of the
PVV’s motions were simply anti-tax or anti-regulation motions that made no ref‐
erence to the elite, foreigner or the deserving poor, the party’s economic policy
agenda should be characterized as neo-liberal instead of the party’s nativism,
authoritarianism or populism.
Table 3 Referents of Economic Populism, Nativism and Authoritarianism
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6 Results
The core question of this article is whether the PVV’s motions were clearly left-
wing, right-wing or mixed and what could help to understand a mix. The first
question is what the balance between left- and right-wing policies is. Table 4
shows an overview of the number of motions the party proposed in different cat‐
egories. When looking at the left-right orientation of the motions, one can see
that indeed the Freedom Party has a mixed profile: 39% of motions were eco‐
nomic right-wing and 32% economic left-wing. The remaining motions would, for
instance, mix left-wing and right-wing proposals or were concerned with valence
goals such as fighting fraud. The party quite clearly mixes left-wing and right-
wing positions; neither left nor right has a majority when it comes to all propos‐
als. The party cannot be consistently characterized as left- or right-wing. There‐
fore, one would have to reject the left- and right-wing expectation in favour of the
mixed expectation.
A majority of motions can be characterized as economic populist, authoritar‐
ian or nativist. A quarter of the motions are economic nativist. Nine out of ten of
those mention a foreign group (which should be excluded), and a third a national
group (which should benefit). This category includes welfare chauvinist motions
that seek to exclude migrant groups from accessing the welfare state. Yet the eco‐
nomic nativist policies of the PVV go beyond ‘welfare chauvinism’: only a quarter
of all motions in the nativist category explicitly seek to block non-native groups
from access to welfare state benefits, such as social services, housing, healthcare
and education. A sixth of nativist motions propose to limit access to the labour
market for foreigners. Other economic nativist motions, for instance, focus on
foreign states: they propose to cut development aid, oppose bailout plans during
the sovereign debt crisis, limit trade or propose to cut funding for the Caribbean
islands that form part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.8 Economic nativism is
thus a lot broader than simply welfare chauvinism: it is the idea that the eco‐
nomic activity of the government should benefit only native Dutch people and
not others.


















2006-2010 30% 25% 45% +16 21% 26% 15% 59% 304
2010-2012 26% 36% 38% +11 19% 24% 16% 55% 201
2012-2017 35% 30% 35% -1 13% 23% 21% 52% 468
All motions 32% 30% 39% +7 17% 24% 18% 55% 973
Balance: percentage of right-wing motions minus the percentage of left-wing motions; At least one of
those: the share of motions that is populist, nativist or authoritarian.
N: Number of motions.
94 doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292019001002001 - Politics of the Low Countries 2019 (1) 2
This article from Politics of the Low Countries is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (RUG)
What Is Left of the Radical Right?
Economic authoritarianism also plays: Almost one in five motions fit in this
category. Three-fifths of these mention a deserving group that should benefit.
Two-fifths of these mention a non-deserving group that should not benefit. Most
of these motions focus on healthcare.9 Finally, a sixth of all PVV economic
motions are economic populist: 98% mention an elite group that should be made
worse off; 37% mention some ‘people’ group that should be made better off. Most
motions with this frame deal with healthcare (where healthcare management is
the focus) or the business sector (most of which focus on the failing bank man‐
agement after the financial crisis). The PVV is more consistently economically
populist, authoritarian and nativist than it is economically left- or right-wing.10
Table 3 also gives some indication of the change over time. It shows that the
PVV is ideologically quite stable: the share of motions that can be characterized as
populist, nativist or authoritarian is always more than 50%. Economic nativist
motions make up the largest category. In terms of left and right one can see a
slight change: the share of left-wing motions increased somewhat, and the share
of right-wing motions decreased over time. All in all, the balance shifts from
slightly to the right to left of the centre. 
 So, the PVV mixes left-wing and right-wing positions, but it is more consis‐
tent in its economic authoritarianism, nativism and populism. Can the latter be
used to understand the former? Table 5 provides two ordered logistic regressions
that can help to elucidate this: they predict the left-right position of a motion by
its referents. The first does not include an interaction between sectors and the
populist referents, and the second does. First, where it concerns economic nati‐
vism: the non-native expectation held that motions that mentioned non-native
groups were more likely to be right-wing. This is indeed the case: there is a clear
negative effect of mentioning these groups on the right-to-left characterization of
motions. So the PVV seeks to reduce government action that would benefit non-
natives. Such an effect is absent for motions that explicitly mention native
groups.
Second, the expectations concerning elite groups were more complex: the
idea was that radical right-wing populist parties would be right-wing where it con‐
cerned public sector elites (public sector elite expectation), but left-wing where it
concerned private sector elites (private sector elite expectation). Model 1 shows
that the PVV is more left-wing on proposals that mention elite groups. Model 2
shows that adding an interaction leads to significant results. As these are all dum‐
mies we can interpret the results quite easily. A motion that mentions elite
groups and concerns the public sector is clearly right-wing.11 A motion that men‐
tions elite groups in the context of the private sector is clearly left-wing.12 This
confirms the expectation that whether the PVV’s anti-elitism is left or right
depends on the sector. When economic populism is applied to the private sector
the PVV predominantly makes left-wing proposals: they seek to regulate irre‐
sponsible businesses, such as the banking sector after the financial crisis. When
economic populism is applied to public sector elites, the PVV proposes cuts in
spending or bureaucracy. This pattern is absent for the motions that mention
mass groups. These are always right-wing, whether they are in the public sector13
or in the private sector.14
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Finally, we can look at the relationship between referring to the deserving or
undeserving groups and left-right policy positions. The deserving poor expecta‐
tion held that when deserving groups are mentioned, the PVV would put forward
left-wing proposals; and where, in contrast, undeserving groups are mentioned it
would present right-wing proposals. Both models 1 and 2 show that motions that
mention undeserving groups (fraudsters, junkies, bullies) are right-wing: these
proposals seek to cut services to undeserving groups. Motions that mention
deserving groups (pensioners, handicapped) are left-wing: they are aimed at
increasing services for these deserving groups. The mix of left- and right-wing
policies here is not due to inconsistency or blurring but actually a reflection of
consistent economic authoritarianism that differentiates between deserving poor
groups that should be supported (‘left-wing’) and undeserving poor groups that
should not be supported (‘right-wing’).
These results show that economic authoritarianism, economic nativism and
economic populism can be used to understand why the PVV mixes left- and right-
wing policies. Because of its economic authoritarianism, the party can combine
Table 5 Ordered Logistic Regression of Left-Right Position and Referents

















Sector = Public - -0.80***
(0.15)
Elite x Sector = Public - -2.80***
(0.23)


















Residual Deviance 1984 1938
AIC 2000 1960
N 973 973
0.1 > * > 0.05 > ** > 0.01 > ***
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left-wing and right-wing positions on economic issues by distinguishing between
the deserving poor, whose hardship is due to circumstances beyond their control
and who should be supported, and the undeserving poor, whose poverty is due to
their own moral failing and who should not be supported. Economic nativist
motions added to the party’s right-wing slant as they sought to limit benefits for
foreign groups. Economic populist motions that concerned the private sector had
a left-wing orientation, as they sought to penalize elite groups.
7 Conclusion
How should one characterize the economic agenda of radical right-wing popu‐
lists? From the perspective of De Lange (2007), the party’s economic agenda,
which balances left and right policies, may be characterized as centrist, while
Rovny (2013) would call its centrism strategic blurring. This article showed that
one can also understand the PVV’s economic agenda from the perspective of the
constituent elements of the ideology of the populist radical right-wing: authori‐
tarianism, populism and nativism. Following Ennser-Jedenastik (2016), this
study showed that these inform their economic agenda more consistently than
the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ do. One can roughly summarize the radical right-wing
populist economic agenda as follows. It desires government action in the econ‐
omy oriented towards the needs of deserving poor groups, such as seniors, and
not towards bureaucrats (‘the elite’), immigrants (‘the other’) and lazy people who
are able to work but refuse to do so (‘the undeserving poor’).
Moreover, this study showed how the approach of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016)
and the conventional left-right approach can be reconciled. The mixing and
matching of left- and right-wing perspectives by the PVV is the expression of dif‐
ferent elements that form a coherent whole: the PVV wants to increase pensions
and healthcare provisions for seniors and decrease bonuses for managers of fail‐
ing banks (left-wing) but opposes the provision of welfare state benefits for immi‐
grants or fraudsters or foreign bailouts that it believes do not benefit the national
economy (right-wing). Economic populism, economic authoritarianism and eco‐
nomic nativism are worthwhile to understand the economic policies of radical
right-wing populist parties.
This article extends the work of Ennser-Jedenastik (2016) by showing that
populism, nativism and authoritarianism were relevant not only for welfare state
policies but also for other economic policies of radical right-wing populist parties.
For instance, the PVV is welfare chauvinist, but its economic nativism goes
beyond that: they also oppose labour migration and financial transfers to foreign
countries.
This study showed that at least in regard to the Dutch PVV, approaching eco‐
nomic issues from a multidimensional perspective was useful. The party cannot
simply be characterized as left or right. If the PVV’s economic policy was
informed by its centrism, its closest allies would be the ChristianUnion to its left
and the Democrats 66 to its right. However, if one would see that the PVV’s appa‐
rent centrism is the result of the fact that it mixes left- and right-wing policies on
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the basis of its authoritarianism, populism and nativism, more likely allies would
be the Liberal Party when the Freedom Party seeks cuts to spending for immi‐
grants, undeserving poor and bureaucrats and the Socialist Party when the PVV
protects the deserving poor and attacks corporate elites.
So what do these results mean beyond the border of the Dutch case? The
Freedom Party was a likely case to find these patterns, so no far-reaching conclu‐
sions can be drawn from it. Still one may expect that the centrism of other radical
right-wing populist parties may be a result of these parties pursuing nativist,
authoritarian and populist economic policies. The Flemish Interest, the Danish
People’s Party, the Front National, the True Finns and Sweden Democrats are
likely cases to have economic policy platforms similar to the PVV and the FPÖ.
Some radical right-wing populist parties may veer more clearly to the economic
right, such as the Alternative for Germany, UK Independence Party, the Norwe‐
gian Progress Party and the Swiss People’s Party. The majority of the proposals of
these three parties may simply be proposals to cut taxes and regulations without
references to nativism or populism. If their populism or nativism would express
itself in their economic policies, it would only be to support their right-wing
agenda by focusing on government elites or welfare state access for immigrants.
Future research may want to determine the extent to which authoritarianism,
populism and nativism are reflected in the economic policies of other radical
right-wing populist parties and the extent to which this party family may stand
more united on the economic implications of their shared ideology than on the
left-right dimension.
Notes
1 The question used was: ‘Some people think that the differences in incomes in our
country should be increased. Others think that they should be decreased. How would
you place the PVV on a line from 1 to 7, where 1 means differences in income should
be increased and 7 means that differences in income should be decreased?’ By compar‐
ison, 71% of voters put the Labour Party on the pro-redistribution side and 62% the
Liberal Party on the anti-redistribution side. It is not that voters are completely oblivi‐
ous to the policies of the PVV: 80% of voters identified the party as anti-immigration
in a similar question.
2 It is an unanswered question whether economic authoritarianism and welfare chau‐
vinism are separate. Both at the political and at the electoral level these notions
appear to be linked: in studies of deservingness, citizens tend to consider immigrants
to be less deserving than natives (Hjorth, 2016; Van Oorschot, 2006). At the same
time, deservingness is also employed in political debates about the economic implica‐
tions of immigration (Keskinen, Norocel & Jørgensen, 2016). Norocel (2016, p. 3) and
Schumacher and Van Kersbergen (2016, p. 3) equate the foreign ‘Other’ with the
undeserving poor. They therefore contrast the category of ‘undeserving others’ with
the ‘deserving natives’.
3 Here parties have to write clear policy positions if they propose a motion. Compared
with some measures that look at election manifestos (Pellikaan et al., 2016), this
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measure does not indicate lower scores if parties do not speak out on issues; rather it
looks only at the actual policies parties commit themselves too.
4 Formally, MPs need the support of at least four other MPs to propose motions, but
this rule is not enforced (Bovend’Eert & Kummeling, 2010, p. 343).
5 In the period that Wilders was an independent MP, he proposed only two motions
that touch on economic issues. These are disregarded.
6 Although many of these motions concerned economic issues in this sense that the
parties favoured or opposed defence, justice and transport spending. These issues are
disregarded because they tend to defy a left-right logic: here left-wing parties tend to
propose to cut public spending and right-wing parties ask for more spending. By
excluding these issues the likelihood of finding more consistent right-wing position‐
ing for the PVV is increased, something that goes against the mixed expectation.
7 Public sector encompasses the budget, culture, development aid, education, the EU,
government operations, healthcare, housing, civic integration, pensions, social secur‐
ity and youth care. The private sector concerns communication, energy, enterprise,
labour and taxation.
8 In contrast to conservatives of earlier eras, the Freedom Party does not see the Dutch
Antilles as part of the fatherland. As the PVV 2012 manifesto put it succinctly: ‘[i]f it
is up to the PVV, the Dutch Antilles would become a foreign country as soon as possi‐
ble.’
9 One additional question that comes up is to what extent economic nativism and eco‐
nomic authoritarianism, which are often equated in the literature, are actually empiri‐
cally distinct (Mudde, 2007; Norocel, 2016; Schumacher & Van Kersbergen, 2016).
When one strictly looks at the coding, the overlap is small: only on a limited number
of occasions (12 motions) is the undeserving group equated with a foreign group. So
empirically these two are different. A the same time, there are differences between the
recipients of the kind of social security schemes that the PVV seeks to support (such
as the government-ensured minimum pension (‘AOW’)) and those that it seeks to
weaken (such as the welfare scheme ‘bijstand’ that every legal resident without the
means to survive in the Netherlands can call on) under the banner of its economic
authoritarianism: according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (2015), 3% of people
with a Dutch passport rely on welfare compared with 11% of non-Dutch people who
live in the Netherlands; in contrast, 20% of residents of the Netherlands whose
parents were both born in the Netherlands receive a government-insured pension,
compared with only 11% of residents of the Netherlands one of whose parents is not
born in the Netherlands (CBS, 2016). Boosting pension spending and limiting welfare
spending can be understood from an economic nativist perspective, but that goes
beyond the approach of this article. This is an example of indirect welfare chauvinism
(Careja, Elmelund-Præstekær, Klitgaard & Larsen, 2016).
10 Three motions could be characterized as anti-nativist (two motions called to defund
Dutch development organizations for their opposition to the Israeli government, and
one sought to attract more foreign investors to the Netherlands); four motions could
be characterized as anti-populist (these sought, for instance, to maintain distinction
between research universities and universities of applied science); and a single motion
as anti-authoritarian.
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11 The total effect (of referring to elite groups, to the public sector and their interaction)
is -1.08 and therefore greater than the -0.03 threshold.
12 The coefficient is 2.52 and significantly higher than 1.39.
13 The total effect (of referring to mass groups, to the public sector and their interaction)
is -0.64, which is significantly beyond the -0.03 threshold.
14 The coefficient (-1.08) is significantly lower than -0.03.
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